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Abstract— Recent advances in technology enable public or 
commercial establishments (for e.g. malls, coffee shops, 
airports) and individual data plan subscribers to operate as 
Wi-Fi providers (WFP), offering Internet access. However, 
the model of a monthly flat service fee charged by ISP to 
establishment or individual WFPs offers very little 
incentives for ISP to provide additional bandwidth to 
WFP’s customers. Thus, these users may experience 
insufficient bandwidth when there is high demand for 
bandwidth. In addition, ISP even discourages individual 
subscribers to provide Internet access through their 
smartphone because such practices may cause market 
saturation. To address this, in this paper we propose a 
dynamic pricing scheme and a revenue sharing mechanism 
that provide incentives for ISP to support establishment 
and individual Wi-Fi providers offering Internet access to 
users. Our revenue sharing model is based on Shapley value 
mechanism.  Importantly, our proposed revenue sharing 
mechanism captures the power negotiation between ISP 
and Wi-Fi providers, and how shifts in the power balance 
between the two entities influence revenue division. 
Specifically, the model assures that the party who 
contributes more receives a higher portion of the revenue. 
In addition to that, the division of revenue eventually 
converges to a percentage value.  
Index Terms - Network Pricing, Wireless Ad hoc Network, Wi-Fi. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To cater to the rising demand for Internet access, there is a 
growing number of public and commercial establishments 
offering Internet access, such as airports, coffee shops, 
libraries, etc. In addition to these, smartphones now have built-
in Wi-Fi hotspot function that allows individual subscribers to 
provide Internet access. These establishments and subscribers 
can become secondary Wi-Fi providers and may offer their 
service for some monetary reward.  However, there is very little 
incentive, and at the same time, there are challenges for Internet 
Service Providers (ISP) to support these alternative channels in 
their provision of Internet access to users. For example, 
allowing individual subscribers to provide Internet access, 
which we refer in this paper as individual Wi-Fi provider (I-
WFP),  means there will be more parties offering Internet 
access, making it more challenging for ISP to have an oversight 
of the market or control over pricing. From network 
management perspective, allowing I-WFP to provide such 
service may cause the market for Internet access to become 
saturated. Another example, establishment Wi-Fi providers (E-
WFP) like malls or coffee shops commonly offer the Internet 
service free-of-charge or for a flat price. Both free-of-charge or 
flat fee arrangements offer little economic incentives for the E-
WFP as well as ISP to offer additional bandwidthfQ to their 
users. Importantly, both E-WFP and I-WFP rely on ISP to 
provide the Internet access, i.e. ISP is ultimately responsible 
for the traffic generated by Wi-Fi users of E-WFP and I-WFP. 
In order to leverage on the emergence of E-WFPs and I-WFPs 
as secondary Wi-Fi providers, we will need to overcome the 
incentive barrier for ISP to enable such service and to provide 
Additional bandwidth.  In this paper, we propose a pricing 
scheme and revenue sharing mechanism that provide 
incentives for ISP to support these secondary Wi-Fi providers 
and to offer additional bandwidth to their users. Our pricing 
model and revenue sharing mechanism collectively address 
concerns on network traffic load and price. Importantly, the 
revenue sharing mechanism assures economic incentives for 
both ISP and these secondary Wi-Fi providers.   
We investigate the revenue sharing mechanism where 
secondary Wi-Fi providers share their revenue gained from 
providing the internet access to users with ISP. We build our 
revenue sharing model based on Shapley value mechanism 
[1,2] because of its capacity to divide the revenue “fairly” 
between parties involved. Our study shows that the cooperative 
scenario provides more incentives to ISP and secondary Wi-Fi 
providers to offer Additional bandwidth to users. That is, our 
cooperative revenue sharing model ensures that ISP’s share of 
revenue increases as the secondary Wi-Fi providers generate 
higher income.  
Following the revenue sharing model, we explore the pricing 
mechanism. Here, we argue that dynamic pricing strategy 
provides better economic incentives to both ISP and secondary 
Wi-Fi providers than a flat fee or free service. Our pricing 
model is built upon two principles: firstly, the pricing fluctuates 
according to the level of bandwidth demand. For  ISP to set the 
minimum sale price to a secondary Wi-Fi provider, ISP must 
consider the total traffic load generated by these Wi-Fi 
providers as well as those generated by ISP’s direct 
subscribers. Similarly, a secondary Wi-Fi provider computes 
the price to its users according to the level of demand, i.e. price 
rises as the level of demand increases. The second principle is, 
the final price charged to users of secondary Wi-Fi providers 
must be equal or higher than the minimum price set by ISP. 
This is because the minimum price set by ISP considers the 
overall bandwidth demand on the network, not just the demand 
from the users of secondary Wi-Fi providers. Hence, when the 
minimum price set by ISP is higher than the price set by 
secondary Wi-Fi providers, ISP’s price prevails and users are 
Pricing and Revenue Sharing for Secondary Data Market 
Hengky Susanto1, Bhanu Kaushik1, Benyuan Liu1, Honggang Zhang2 and ByungGuk Kim1  
1 Department of Computer Science, University of Massachusetts at Lowell.  
2 Engineering Deptement , University of Massachusetts at Bostom. 
{hsusanto, Bliu, Bkaushik, Kim}@cs.uml.edu, honggang.zhang@umb.edu 
 charged with price set by ISP. These pricing frameworks are 
formulated into Network Utility Maximization (NUM) 
problem [3,4,5], which is resolved using subgradient based 
algorithm. 
As secondary Wi-Fi providers, there is however a significant 
difference between establishment-WFP and individual-WFP: 
E-WFP pays a monthly fee for an unlimited amount of data 
usage, while I-WFP pays a monthly fee for a set quota of data. 
Therefore, the revenue sharing and pricing mechanism are 
tailored to incorporate this difference. For instance, the revenue 
sharing between ISP and E-WFP is designed to incentivize both 
entities to offer Additional bandwidth to E-WFP’s users. On 
the other hand, revenue sharing between ISP and I-WFP is 
designed to provide incentive for ISP to allow I-WFPs to sell 
the unused bandwidth; at the same time, it discourages I-WFPs 
from achieving significant profitability from the transactions to 
prevent market saturation, as discussed in section II.   
For reselling of bandwidth by E-WFP, our study shows that 
this pricing model provides incentive for both ISP and E- WFP 
to offer Additional bandwidth to their users. In addition, our 
revenue sharing model also discourages E-WFP’s users from 
transmitting more data when ISP is experiencing congestion at 
ISP’s end. Another important observation is that our revenue 
sharing model also captures the shift in bargaining power 
between ISP and E-WFP according to the amount of revenue 
generated. Specifically, the revenue sharing model apportions 
a larger share of the revenue to ISP when E-WFP is generating 
a lower revenue, and this is understandably so because ISP has 
to incur a minimum infrastructure overhead cost at all times. 
When E-WFP generates higher revenue from its users, our 
model attributes a higher portion of the revenue in recognition 
of its more significant contribution. However, the division of 
revenue for each E-WFP and ISP converges to a percentage 
value even when E-WFP generates most of the revenue, never 
to the disadvantage of the ISP. 
As for I-WFP, our investigation emphasizes on a cooperative 
scenario where revenue is dynamically shared between ISP and 
the I-WFP, depending on the final sale price to users and traffic 
condition. This revenue sharing model is built based on 
Shapley value mechanism [1] because of its capacity to divide 
the revenue “fairly” between parties involved. Our study shows 
that such revenue sharing arrangement provides more 
incentives to ISP to support I-WFP and its users. Critically 
important is that this revenue sharing model ensures that ISP 
receives the majority portion of the revenue gained, regardless 
of the amount of the final sale price set by the I-WFP to prevent 
subscribers from seeking and achieving profitability (after 
deducting their monthly subscription fee) from selling their 
bandwidths. This is to avoid market saturation. Furthermore, 
our simulation shows that this model discourages I-WFP from 
selling their bandwidth during peak hours and provides the 
upper bound of the percentage I-WFP may receive.  
Outcomes from our investigation, relating to both E-WFP 
and I-WFP, confirm that our revenue sharing model achieves 
“fair” compensation to all parties involved including ISP, as 
according to Shapley value properties 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin with 
the background study in section II where we discuss related 
works, the impact on ISP, and a discussion on the different 
types of pricing and revenue sharing approaches. In section III, 
we present our proposed revenue sharing mechanism between 
ISP and secondary Wi-Fi providers, starting with the general 
model that is relevant to both E-WFP and I-WFP, followed by 
specific customizations according to the traits of E-WFP and I-
WFP. In the followings section, we present the dynamic pricing 
mechanism using the same format: beginning with the general 
principles applicable to both E-WFP and I-WFP, followed by 
separate customization  to meet the different conditions of E-
WFP and I-WFP. The simulation results are presented in 
section V, followed by concluding remarks. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Related Work 
In [6], the authors propose a pricing strategy based on online 
mechanism design (OMD) to provide Wi-Fi service to 
Starbucks’ customers. Their pricing strategy is designed on the 
basis of users dynamically arriving and leaving the coffee shop 
in a period of time; additionally they also consider that users 
make certain decisions based on particular outcomes as time 
progresses, such as a customer may decide to leave the shop 
after he/she has finished his/her drink, or to stay longer for 
more drinks. In addition, their pricing strategy also requires 
users to reveal their true valuation of the Internet access and 
their arrival time at the coffee shop.  Our proposal, on the other 
hand, does not require users to reveal their valuation of the 
service to WFP, and price is determined according to network 
traffic, and is available after users start transmitting data. Our 
approach provides more flexibility and the price can be updated 
dynamically in real time setting. Furthermore, the role of ISP 
is not incorporated in the design proposed in [6]. Our model, 
on the other hand, allows ISP to influence WFP’s pricing, 
especially when ISP is experiencing high traffic demand.      
Revenue sharing between ISPs utilizing Shapley value has 
been studied in numerous literatures. For example, [7] has 
studied Shapley value to model ISPs’ routing and 
interconnection decision. Similarly, [8] explores the design of 
profit sharing mechanism using Shapley value that allows the 
revenue to be decided “fairly” among participating ISPs. In [9], 
the authors examine the bilateral prices that can achieve the 
Shapley-value solution in ISP peering. These literatures 
primarily focus on revenue sharing between ISPs that are at par 
or almost equal in stature. In other words, multiple ISPs are 
partnering and collaborating at equal or almost equal level to 
deliver massive amount of data from content providers (like 
Google, CNN, ESPM, etc) to a very large pool of users. Our 
paper is mainly concerned with the revenue sharing between 
ISP and WFP, the latter being a customer of ISP, who relies on 
and pays ISP for Internet access. As WFP’s network 
infrastructure is made up of only consumer level routers 
serving a much smaller pool of users, equal partnership 
between ISP and WFP is not possible in this setup.   
 Other than Shapley value based models, [10] proposes 
asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution revenue sharing model 
between different types of ISPs. In this study, Stackelberg 
game, a non-cooperative game model, is considered in their 
 pricing scheme, where a group of ISPs decide their prices 
according to the prices being offered in the market by other 
ISPs. In contrast, Shapley value based revenue sharing model 
is a cooperative based game theory [1]. In our discussion later 
we show that the cooperative model is more favorable for ISP, 
and yields a higher revenue for both ISP and WFP.  
Finally, the authors of [11] propose a revenue sharing 
mechanism between global WFPs (Skype) and local WFPs 
(coffee shops, hotels, etc.) and the mechanism to incentivize 
local WFP to support Skype. In this setup, Skype users 
completely rely on WFP to provide the Additional bandwidth. 
Our model, in contrast, requires collaboration between WFP 
and ISP to provide Additional bandwidth. Furthermore, our 
proposed revenue sharing model divides the revenue according 
to the contribution of the participating parties.  
B. Impact on ISP   
In order to design a suitable pricing and sharing mechanism, 
the impact of traffic from E-WFP and I-WFP on ISP must be 
considered. Users of these WFPs may increase the amount of 
data being injected into the network; especially during peak 
hours, the additional traffic may cause network to become even 
more congested, putting more pressures on ISP. Moreover, a 
higher traffic load may also negatively affect the connection 
quality of E-WFP’s and I-WFP’s users and degrade network 
performance. From a commercial perspective, while E-WFP 
and I-WFP may benefit financially from the fees charged to 
their users, ISP may have to incur higher costs to support the 
additional traffic without net additional financial benefits.  
There is another concern relating particularly to I-WFP: 
network access through I-WFP becomes widely available at 
low prices, subscribers with low data usage may potentially 
cease their monthly subscription and choose to buy their 
network access from I-WFP as and when they need the 
connection. Higher demand for such ad hoc connection in turn 
may encourage some users to subscribe to data plan with the 
intention to resell bandwidth for profit. Over time, this may 
result in market saturation and loss of revenue for ISP. Given 
all these concerns and the potential ripple effects, the general 
opinion is that there is very little incentive for ISP to allow their 
subscribers to sell their unused bandwidth to reduce data plan 
underutilization. 
Pertaining to the concerns and challenges raised, we propose 
a pricing and revenue sharing strategy that not only assure 
economic incentives for ISP, but also address network 
congestion. The pricing mechanism is made up of two parts: 
First, the pricing strategy between ISP and E-WFP/I-WFP 
where ISP determines the minimum price to resell the 
bandwidth at; simultaneously, E-WFP/I-WFP compute and 
decide their final sale price to the prospective users based on 
the level of their demand.  Following that, we address the 
revenue sharing mechanism between ISP and E-WFP/I-WFP 
in both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios.  
C. Free Service, Flat-rate, and Dynamic Pricing 
To decide which pricing mechanism is appropriate to support 
E-WFP or I-WFP and provide Additional bandwidth, we first 
explore the tradeoffs between free service, flat-rate, and 
dynamic pricing. Free Internet access is commonly employed 
by E-WFPs to entice customers to boost their business sales. 
For example, a coffee shop offers free Wi-Fi to attract more 
customers to come and linger, with the objective of achieving 
higher sales per customer. E-WFP has very little incentive to 
provide Additional bandwidth because it does not gain obvious 
additional financial benefit from users enjoying good 
connection, especially when good connection has little direct 
impact on increasing the sale of their primary product/service. 
Similarly, flat rate pricing strategy for Internet access also 
provides little incentive for E-WFP to offer Additional 
bandwidth. For example, a hotel guest may pay a daily flat-rate 
($20 per day) during his/her stay, and providing good 
connection does not increase the revenue because the guest still 
pays the same rate regardless of the quality of the connection. 
By the same token, there is little incentive for ISP to offer 
Additional bandwidth if E-WFP pays a flat-rate to ISP. As a 
result, without ISP’s support for Additional bandwidth, E-WFP 
may not be able to offer Additional bandwidth even if it desires 
to. The same argument also applies to I-WFPs so that free 
service and flat rate are less desirable for offering Additional 
bandwidth.  
Dynamic pricing is a usage-based pricing strategy where 
users pay according to the amount of bandwidth they use. This 
pricing model may provide more incentive to E-WFP and I-
WFP to offer Additional bandwidth because users must pay 
more for a better connection quality, which leads to higher 
earnings for the providers. This pricing strategy can also be 
used to prevent congestion when there is more demand than 
available bandwidth by increasing the price to reduce traffic 
load. Therefore, dynamic pricing not only offers more 
opportunity for higher revenue, it also gives Wi-Fi providers 
better control over traffic. Similar arguments apply to ISP on 
the employment of dynamic pricing to support provision of 
Additional bandwidth to users of E-WFP and I-WFP. 
D. Cooperative Versus Non-Cooperative Strategies 
In order to investigate what revenue sharing mechanism may 
provide better incentive for ISP to support E-WFP and I-WFP 
for Additional bandwidth, we explore both cooperative and 
non-cooperative strategies. 
Assumption 1. Price charged 𝜆 by Wi-Fi providers, both E-
WFP and E-WFP, to users is at least the price charged 𝑔 by 
ISP, i.e.  𝜆 ≥ 𝑔.  
In the non-cooperative setting, ISP determines and charges 
Wi-Fi provider with the price 𝑔. Then, Wi-Fi provider sells the 
bandwidth to users at price 𝜆 and pays ISP price 𝑔, where 𝑔 ≤
𝜆. Here, Wi-Fi provider gets to keep the difference between 𝜆 
and 𝑔. In all circumstances, ISP will not know Wi-Fi provider’s 
final sale price 𝜆 to users. This scenario may not be favorable 
to ISP especially when final sale price 𝜆 is significantly higher 
than the price ISP charged to Wi-Fi provider 𝑔 because ISP 
does not get a proportionately higher share of the revenue. This 
non-cooperative strategy may also not be favorable to users 
because ISP does gain any additional financial benefit from 
allocating more resources for better connection. As a result, 
users may experience poor performance during peak time even 
after paying a high price to WFP. Thus, non-cooperative model 
is not supportive to user demand for Additional bandwidth.  
 In the cooperative setting, in addition to ISP deciding the 
minimum selling price 𝑔 to Wi-Fi provider and Wi-Fi provider 
setting the final sale price 𝜆 to their users, ISP and WFP share 
the total final revenue received at price 𝜆. In this model, ISP is 
informed of the final sale price 𝜆 to users, and its portion of the 
revenue corresponds to the final price. By having visibility of 
the final sale price to users, ISP is able to monitor and assess 
the actual demand and value of the service. To fully develop 
this concept, we propose a revenue sharing mechanism based 
on Shapley value [6]. This mechanism is desirable because it 
exhibits several fairness properties that ensure revenue sharing 
is proportional to each party’s contribution to the value of the 
revenue.  
III. REVENUE SHARING 
In this section, we address the mechanism of how the revenue 
gained from selling bandwidth to users is shared between Wi-
Fi providers and ISP using revenue sharing mechanism based 
on Shapley value [1]. We first begin with the general principles 
that apply to both E-WFP and I-WFP, referred generically as 
WFP in this section.  
 
Fig. 1. Shapley value based revenue sharing.  
Figure 1 generally illustrates how revenue 𝑅 is shared: 𝜙𝑤 
apportioned to WFP 𝑤 and 𝜙𝑖 to ISP 𝑖, depending on their 
relative contribution. 
A. Desirable Sharing Properties 
The design of the revenue sharing mechanism should satisfy 
these following properties. Let 𝑅(. ) be the revenue function 
and variable 𝜙 denotes a vector of Shapley value. Let 𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}) 
denote the total revenue from providing network service by 
WFP 𝑤, where 𝑤 subscribes bandwidth from ISP 𝑖. The 
Shapley value has the following desirable properties [1,2]: 
Property 1 (efficiency): 𝜙𝑤 + 𝜙𝑖 = 𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}).  
The efficiency property requires the revenue shared to equal 
to the revenue from the service. In other words, the mechanism 
does not contribute or receive extra revenue.  
Property 2 (Symmetry): If 𝑅(𝑤 ∪ 𝑖) = 𝑅(𝑖 ∪ 𝑤), then 𝜙𝑤 =
𝜙𝑖 . 
The symmetry property requires that when ISP and WFP 
each contributes equally to the generation of the revenue, both 
should receive same portion of the revenue.   
Property 3 (Dummy player): If 𝑤 is a dummy WFP, 
𝑅(𝑤 ∪ 𝑖) =  𝑅(𝑖) and 𝜙𝑤 = 0. 
This property assures that when WFP 𝑤 is not contributing, 
then WFP 𝑤 receives zero share. Since WFP 𝑤 relies on ISP’s 
infrastructure to sell bandwidth to users, ISP always has a 
contribution in supporting the network service, but not 
necessarily the WFP 𝑤. 
Property 4 (fairness): For any WFP 𝑤 and ISP 𝑖, the portion 
of revenue share is proportional to their respective contribution 
to the total revenue gained from the sale. This property 
addresses the fairness of revenue sharing between any pair of 
〈𝑤, i〉. 
Property 5 (additivity): Lets separate a transaction into two 
parts, such that 𝑇 = 𝑇1 + 𝑇2. For any two transaction 𝑇1 and 𝑇2, 
𝜙𝑖(𝑁, 𝑇1 + 𝑇2) = 𝜙𝑖(𝑁, 𝑇1) + 𝜙𝑖(𝑁, 𝑇2), where 𝑁 = {𝑤, 𝑖} 
and (𝑁, 𝑇1 + 𝑇2) is defined by (𝑇1 + 𝑇2)𝑆 = 𝑇1(𝑆) + 𝑇2(𝑆) for 
every coalition of 𝑆.  
The property addresses the process of getting the Shapley 
value. The premise is that the outcome from transaction 
(𝑁, 𝑇1 + 𝑇2) should be equal to the addition of two different 
transactions of (𝑁, 𝑇1) and (𝑁, 𝑇2). To illustrate the idea, 
imagine WFP receive revenue according to transaction (𝑁, 𝑇1) 
on the first day and (𝑁, 𝑇2) on the second day. Assume that 𝑇1 
and 𝑇2 are independent. Then, WFP’s share from both days 
should be the summation of revenue shared from both 
transactions. In other words, this property guarantees that if the 
revenue of the service provided by WFP is additive, then the 
distributed revenue is the sum of the revenue generated for 
providing the service.  
B. Shapley Value Methodology 
In this section, we will address the revenue sharing 
implementation between ISP and WFP using Shapley Value. 
Definition 1. The  Shapley value 𝜙 is defined by  
𝜙𝑗 =
1
|𝑁|!
 ∑ ∆𝑖(𝑅, 𝑍(𝜋, 𝑖))
𝜋∈Π
, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑁,               (1) 
where 𝑁 = {𝑤, 𝑖}, 𝑍 ⊆N, and 
∆𝑗(𝑅, 𝑍(𝜋, 𝑗)) = 𝑅( 𝑍 ∪ {𝑗} − 𝑅(𝑍) ),                (2) 
where 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁. Remark: Given (𝑁, 𝑅), consider a permutation 
on 𝜋 on the set 𝑁. Members of set 𝑁 appear to “collect” their 
revenue according to the ordering 𝜋. For each member in 𝑁, let 
𝑍𝜋
𝑗
 be the set of members preceding member 𝑖, where 𝑍𝜋
𝑗 ⊆ 𝑁.  
The marginal contribution of member 𝑗 according to 𝜋 is 
∆𝑗(𝑅, 𝑍(𝜋, 𝑗)) =  𝑅 (𝑍𝜋
𝑗 ∪ {𝑗} − 𝑅(𝑍𝜋
𝑗 )). Here, the Shapley 
value can be interpreted as the expected marginal contribution 
∆𝑗(𝑅, 𝑍), where 𝑍 is preceding 𝑗 in an uniformly distributed 
random ordering. Since in this model |𝑁| = 2, that is 𝑁 =
{𝑤, 𝑖}, the Shapley value for 𝑤 and 𝑖 can be resolved by the 
following approach: 
𝜙𝑖 =
1
2
 𝑅({𝑖}) +
1
2
(𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}) − 𝑅({𝑤}))                 (3) 
𝜙𝑤 =
1
2
𝑅({𝑤}) +
1
2
 (𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}) − 𝑅({𝑖})),               (4) 
for 𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}) = 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜙𝑤. Here, ISP 𝑖 will keep 𝜙𝑖 of the 
revenue, while WFP 𝑤 will receive 𝜙𝑤 of the revenue, as 
illustrated in figure 1.  
Total revenue 𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}) earned at the WFP’s end is defined 
as follows. 
𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}) =  ∑ 𝑥𝑠 𝜆𝑠
𝑓  
𝑠 ∈ 𝑤
 .                           (5) 
Here 𝑥𝑠 and 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
 denote bandwidth usage and the final price 
𝜙𝑖 
Total Revenue  𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}) 
𝜙𝑤 
 charged by WFP 𝑤 to user 𝑠 respectively. Therefore,  
𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}) =  ∑  𝑥𝑠 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
𝑠 ∈ 𝑤
 =  𝜙𝑤 + 𝜙𝑖  , 
where the term 𝑠 ∈ 𝑤 denotes user 𝑠 utilizing the Internet 
service provided by WFP 𝑤. Additionally, in Shapley value 
methodology, 𝑅({𝑤}) and 𝑅({𝑖}) are the contributions of the 
Wi-Fi provider and ISP to revenue 𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}) respectively, but 
they also can be interpreted as the revenue that they will gain if 
they do not collaborate. Here, 𝑅({𝑤}) is determined by solving 
the following equation 
𝑅({𝑖}) =  ∑ 𝑥𝑠 𝑔𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑤
 ,                               (6) 
where 𝑔𝑠 denotes the price determined by ISP to provide 
service to user 𝑠. Revenue 𝑅({𝑖}) can be interpreted as the cost 
charged by ISP to WFP at price 𝑔𝑠 for providing service to user 
𝑠. In (6), it is indicated that ISP charges different price to 
different user. However, since WFP relies on ISP to provide 
the network access, when 𝑅({𝑤}) = 0, then 𝑅({𝑖}) =
𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}), which means ISP keeps the entire revenue of 
𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}). Thus,  
𝑅({𝑖}) = {
∑ 𝑥𝑠 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
 
𝑠 ∈ 𝑤
,         𝑅({𝑤}) > 0
𝑅({𝑤, 𝑖}),           𝑅({𝑤}) = 0.
               (7) 
The following two sections describe how 𝑅({𝑤}) is defined 
separately for E-WFP and I-WFP to address how each 
specifically contributes to total revenue 𝑅({𝑤}).   
C. The Contribution of E-WFP 
E-WFP’s contribution 𝑅({𝑤𝐸}) to 𝑅({𝑤𝐸 , 𝑖}) is determined 
as follows.  
𝑅({𝑤𝐸}) =
 ∑  (𝜆𝑠 − 𝑔𝑠)𝑥𝑠𝑠 𝜖 𝑤
max(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑤), 𝛽)
 ,                 (8) 
where   
𝑔𝑤 = ∑ 𝑔𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑤𝐸
 
and 𝛽 > 1 is a positive constant to guarantee the denominator 
is greater than 1. To assure that a portion of the revenue is 
allocated to E-WFP, the denomination factor in (8) is concave 
and flattened as 𝑔𝑤 increases. Moreover, the gap between 𝜆𝑠 
and 𝑔𝑠 is considered in (8) to assure E-WFP receives more if  
𝜆𝑠 increases. 
In our design of 𝑅({𝑤𝐸}), E-WFP’s contribution is 
proportional to cost incurred by ISP to provide the access. A 
higher cost 𝑔𝑤 for access results in a lower E-WFP contribution 
to the total revenue. Next, we show that the property of revenue 
sharing mechanism. 
Theorem 1.  The revenue sharing mechanism assures that ISP’s 
revenue portion at least covers the cost of providing service to 
E-WFP, i.e.  
𝜙𝑖 ≥ ∑ 𝑥𝑠 𝑔𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑤
. 
Proof. By assumption that 𝑔𝑠 ≤ 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
, that 𝑔𝑠 ≤ 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
, 𝜆𝑠
𝑓 − 𝑔𝑠 ≥ 0. 
Thus, by comparing 𝜆𝑠
𝑓 − 𝑔𝑠 and 𝑅({𝑤}) in e.q. (8), we have 
the following equality. 
∑  (𝜆𝑠
𝑓
− 𝑔𝑠)
𝑠 𝜖 𝑤
≥
 ∑  (𝜆𝑠
𝑓
− 𝑔𝑠)𝑠 𝜖 𝑤
max(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑤), 𝛽)
. 
Observe that in the equality above, as the 𝑔𝑤 = ∑ 𝑔𝑠𝑠𝜖𝑤  
increases, the right side of the equality decreases quicker than 
the left side. Next, this equality can be derived further as 
follows. 
∑ 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
𝑠 𝜖 𝑤
− ∑ 𝑔𝑠
𝑠 𝜖 𝑤
≥
 ∑  (𝜆𝑠
𝑓
− 𝑔𝑠)𝑠 𝜖 𝑤
max(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑤), 𝛽)
, 
Which is also  
∑ 𝑔𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑤
 ≤ ∑ 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
𝑠∈𝑤
−
 ∑  (𝜆𝑠
𝑓
− 𝑔𝑠)𝑠𝜖𝑤
max(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑤), 𝛽)
. 
By considering bandwidth 𝑥𝑠 allocated for every user 𝑠 that 
receives service from WFP 𝑤,  equality above also implies. 
∑(𝑥𝑠 𝑔𝑠)
𝑠𝜖𝑤
 ≤ ∑  (𝑥𝑠 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
)
𝑠∈𝑤
−
 ∑  (𝜆𝑠
𝑓
− 𝑔𝑠)𝑠𝜖𝑤 𝑥𝑠
max(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑤), 𝛽)
.        (9) 
By combining (3) with (5), (6), and (8), we have  
𝜙𝑖 =
1
2
 ∑(𝑥𝑠 𝑔𝑠)
𝑠𝜖𝑤
+
1
2
(∑(𝑥𝑠 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
)
𝑠∈𝑤
−
∑  (𝜆𝑠
𝑓
− 𝑔𝑠)𝑠𝜖𝑤 𝑥𝑠
2 max(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑔𝑤), 𝛽)
).  (10) 
Next, we substitute (9) to (10), such that 
𝜙𝑖 ≥
1
2
 ∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑤
𝑔𝑠 +
1
2
∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑤
𝑔𝑠 = ∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑤
𝑔𝑠. 
Thus, 𝜙𝑖 ≥ ∑ (𝑥𝑠 𝑔𝑠)𝑠𝜖𝑤 , which is the revenue shared apportion 
to ISP covers the minimum cost. ∎ 
Additionally, by definition, E-WFP’s minimum share of 
revenue is described by e.q. (8).  
D. The Contribution of I-WFP 
Next, our proposal determines I-WFP’s 𝑅({𝑤𝐼}) is 
designed to only allow users to offset some of the data plan 
subscription fee they pay each month, and not for profitability. 
The objective of this approach to reselling unused bandwidth 
is to somewhat alleviate the sentiment of money wasted 
because of underutilized data plan at the end of each month. 
Furthermore, 𝑅({𝑤𝐼}) is subjected to  
𝑅({𝑤𝐼})  ≤ 𝑅({𝑤𝐼 , 𝑖}) − 𝑅({𝑖}),            (11) 
for 𝑅({𝑖}) > 0. Condition (11) is to assure ISP’s share is at 
least 𝑅({𝑖}). Since the magnitude of 𝑅({𝑖}) influences how 
much revenue an I-WFP 𝑤𝐼  receives, 𝑅({𝑤𝐼}) is capped 
according to the law of diminishing returns, where the 
contribution to the total revenue diminishes as 𝑅({?̇?}) grows. 
Thus, 𝑅({𝑤𝐼}) is concave and is defined as follows. 
 𝑅({𝑤𝐼}) = 𝜔 log (𝛼 (𝑅({𝑤𝐼 , 𝑖}) − 𝑅({𝑖}))),   (12) 
where 𝛼 is a positive constant variable decided by ISP, positive 
weight function 𝜔 =
𝑥𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐵𝑊 
𝑥𝑑𝑝
. Here,  𝑥𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑𝐵𝑊  denotes the 
unused bandwidth at time 𝑡 and 𝑥𝑑𝑝 is the total of bandwidth 
included in the monthly data plan (𝑥𝑑𝑝 is replenished at the 
beginning of the billing cycle).  Weight 𝜔 is an indication of 
the usage level, i.e. a user with higher 𝜔𝑡 implies a lower data 
usage and vice versa. Furthermore, 𝜔 is also used to limit 
reselling of bandwidth to low data usage subscribers in order to 
help them reduce the excess of data plan underutilization. Also, 
in order to prevent I-WFP from making profit after deducting 
their subscription fee at the end of the billing cycle, the total 
amount of revenue received by I-WFP from reselling 
transactions does not exceed their subscription fee. Thus,       
𝑅({𝑤𝐼}) = {
0,                 ℎ(𝑤𝐼) ≤ ∑ 𝜙𝑤𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=0
𝑒𝑞(12),            𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,
,    
where 𝐾 is the number of reselling transactions per month cycle 
and ℎ(𝑤𝐼) denotes the monthly fee paid by I-WFP 𝑤𝐼 .   
Theorem 2: I-WFP 𝑤 share of revenue decreases as 𝑥𝑤 →
𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤). 
Proof.  We have 𝑥𝑠 ∈ 𝑥𝑤 , for ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑤𝐼 , that is the amount of 
bandwidth used by I-WFP 𝑤𝐼  including the bandwidth he/she 
has sold. Without losing the originality, let 𝜆𝑠 and 𝑔𝑠 be the 
price that I-WFP charges his/her client 𝑠 and the minimum 
price for 𝑠 determined by ISP respectively.  
𝜕𝑅({𝑤})
𝜕𝑥𝑤
= −
1
2𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤)
log (𝑥𝑤  ∑(𝜆𝑠
𝑓 − 𝑔𝑠)
𝑠∈𝑤
) +
𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤) − 𝑥𝑤
2 𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤) 𝑥𝑤  ∑ (𝜆𝑠
𝑓 − 𝑔𝑠)𝑠∈𝑤
. 
Notice that 
𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤)−𝑥𝑤
2 𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤) 𝑥𝑤  ∑ (𝜆𝑠
𝑓
−𝑔𝑠)𝑠∈𝑤
→ 0, as  𝑥𝑤 → 𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤) and 
−
1
2𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤)
log(𝑥𝑤  ∑ (𝜆𝑠
𝑓 − 𝑔
𝑠
)𝑠∈𝑤 )  ≤ 0. Thus, 
𝜕𝑅({𝑤})
𝜕𝑥𝑤
 decreases, as 
𝑥𝑤 → 𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤), which also implies that 𝑅({𝑤}) decreases when 
𝑥𝑤 → 𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤). Thus, 𝜙𝑤 in (14) decreases as 𝑥𝑤 → 𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤), 
which also satisfies property 1. That is, if 𝑅({𝑤}) decreases, 
then, 𝜙𝑤 also decreases. Next, consider a special case that 
𝑅({𝑤}) = 0 when 𝑥𝑤 = 𝑥𝐷𝑃(𝑤). Constraint (16) satisfies 
property 4, such that 𝜙𝑤 = 0, which means ISP keeps the entire 
revenue share. Thus,  𝜙𝑤 decreases as bandwidth usage 𝑥𝑤 
increases.■ 
Proposition 3 confirms that subscribers with lower data 
usage will receive a higher share of revenue from the reselling 
transactions than subscribers with higher data usage. In 
addition, eq. (17) assures that the portion of reselling revenue 
gained by subscribers diminishes as the amount of bandwidth 
used/sold increases.  Thus, subscribers with higher data usage 
have less incentive to sell their unused bandwidth.  
It is natural for E-WFP or I-WFP to want to maximize 
his/her Shapley value in order to maximize the earning. 
However, it is very difficult to determine their maximum 
earning because maximizing Shapley Value is coNP-hard [2]. 
The solution to Shapley Value maximization problem is 
discussed in [2]. 
IV. PRICING MECHANISM  
In this section, we address ISP’s pricing mechanism that 
applies uniformly to both E-WFP and I-WFP, and the Wi-Fi 
provider’s pricing to users, regardless if they are users of E-
WFP or I-WFP. Therefore, in this section, both E-WFP and I-
WFP are collapsed and referred to as WFP. Figure 2 below 
illustrates the overview of the transaction: after an user 𝑠 makes 
his/her the request for connection, ISP presents WFP with the 
minimum price 𝑔𝑠. At the same time, WFP computes the 
WFP’s price 𝜆𝑠, and  determine the final sale price 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
, as 
formulated 
𝜆𝑠
𝑓 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝜆𝑠 , 𝑔𝑠 + 𝜌),                          (13) 
where 𝜌 denotes a constant minimum profit decided by WFP, 
for  𝜌 ≥ 0. Then, WFP presents price 𝜆𝑠 to user 𝑠 and user 𝑠 
pays the WFP at price 𝜆𝑠.  
 
Fig. 2. Pricing mechanism.  
Moreover, the overview of the pricing formulation is that ISP 
decides the minimum sale price 𝑔𝑠 to support user 𝑠 and at the 
same time WFP also decides the its own price 𝜆𝑠 to user 𝑠. 
Then, user 𝑠 pays the service at price 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
 (the maximum 
between the two prices according to e.q (10)), as illustrated in 
figure 3.       
 
Fig. 3. Pricing Formulation. 
The pricing mechanism also considers multiple users at any 
point of time. We begin by first addressing WFP’s price to user. 
A. User Utility Function 
Let 𝑆𝑤 denotes a set of user 𝑠 using the Internet, for 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑤. 
The objective of user 𝑠 is to solve  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑈(𝑥𝑠  , 𝜆𝑠
𝑓) ,    for  𝑥𝑠 , 𝜆𝑠
𝑓 ≥ 0, 
where  𝑥𝑠 denotes the amount of data usage by user 𝑠 and 𝜆𝑠
𝑡  
denotes the price to be paid by user 𝑠 for Internet access at time 
𝑡. The price is dynamically determined according to the level 
of demand for network service. The utility function of the user 
is defined as follows.  
𝑈(𝑥𝑠  , 𝜆𝑠
𝑓) =  𝑈𝑏𝑤(𝑥𝑠) + 𝑈𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑥𝑠  , 𝜆𝑠
𝑓),  
where 𝑈𝑏𝑤(𝑥𝑠) and 𝑈𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑥𝑠  , 𝜆𝑠
𝑓) denote user 𝑠 utility with 
bandwidth consumption 𝑥𝑠 and service cost, respectively. 
Considering the WFP is operating at frequency band 𝐵𝑠, the 
utility function of bandwidth usage is defined as follows 
Final sale price 𝜆𝑠 
ISP user WFP 
Min. price 𝑔𝑠 
  
 𝑈𝑏𝑤(𝑥𝑠) = 𝑊𝑠 log (𝑥𝑠 (1 +
𝑃𝑠 |𝑐𝑠|
2
𝜕𝑠2 𝐵𝑠
)) , 
where 𝑃𝑠 is the transmission power of user 𝑠 mobile device, 𝑐𝑠 
is the channel gained from WFP 𝑤 to user 𝑠, and 𝜕𝑠
2 is the 
Gaussian noise variance for the channel between 𝑤 and 𝑠 [14]. 
In other words, 𝑈𝑏𝑤(𝑥𝑠) is influenced by the channel quality 
and the amount of bandwidth. Additionally, 𝑈𝑏𝑤(𝑥𝑠) follows 
the law of diminishing returns. This is because more bandwidth 
does not always mean higher satisfaction and SNR 
measurement for wireless is concave [14].  
Utility function 𝑈𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑥𝑠 , 𝜆𝑠
𝑓) represents user satisfaction for 
monetary surplus when the cost paid for Internet access is less 
than the budget, which is defined as follows.  
𝑈𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑥𝑠 , 𝜆𝑠
𝑓) =  1 −
𝑥𝑠 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
𝑚𝑠
, 
where  𝑚𝑠 denotes the budget that user 𝑠 is willing to spend for 
bandwidth 𝑥𝑠. Note that 𝑥𝑠 𝜆𝑠
𝑡  can be interpreted as the price that   
user 𝑠 must pay for the service. Thus, ideally, user’s budget 
matches the price that he/she must pay for the service, such that 
𝑥𝑠 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
𝑚𝑠
= 1 and hence 𝑈𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑥𝑠 , 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
) = 0. Therefore, given price 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
, 
user 𝑠 utilizes 𝑚𝑠 to influence the amount of bandwidth 𝑥𝑠 
allocated to him/her.  
B. Pricing Mechanism of WFP 
The objective of WFP 𝑤 is to maximize its own revenue 
without exceeding its monthly bandwidth capacity. The 
maximization problem is expressed as follows.  
𝑚𝑎𝑥  ∑ 𝑥𝑠 𝜆𝑠
𝑠 𝜖 𝑤
 ,                                    (14)  
𝑠. 𝑡.   ∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠 𝜖 𝑤
 ≤ 𝐶𝑤 ,  
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑥𝑠 ≥ 0,   ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑤, 
where capacity 𝐶𝑤 is amount of WFP’s bandwidth capacity. 
Considering the respective objectives of user and WFP, the 
problem can be formulated into network utility maximization 
(NUM) [2].  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝑈(𝑥𝑠 , 𝜆𝑠)
𝑠 𝜖 𝑤
                                       (15) 
𝑠. 𝑡.   ∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠 𝜖 𝑤
≤ 𝐶𝑤  ,   
over 𝑥𝑠 ≥ 0,   ∀𝑠 ∈ 𝑤, 
The Lagrangian optimization problem is formulated as 
𝐿(?̅?𝑠, ?̅?𝑠) = ∑ 𝑈(𝑥𝑠 , 𝜆𝑠)
𝑠𝜖𝑤
− ∑ 𝑥𝑠 𝜆𝑠 
𝑠𝜖𝑤
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑠 𝐶𝑤
𝑠𝜖𝑤
, 
where 𝐿(. ) is the Lagrangian form and 𝜆𝑠 is known as the 
Lagrangian multiplier, which is often interpreted as the link 
price, and ?̅?𝑠 is a vector of 𝑥𝑠 , for ∀𝑠 𝜖 𝑤, and 𝜆̅𝑠 is a vector of  
𝜆𝑠 . The common solution to NUM problem is the subgradient 
based method [3]. Typically, the dual problem 𝐷 to the primal 
problem of (12) is constructed as follows  
min 𝐷(?̅?𝑠 ) ,   𝑠. 𝑡   ?̅?𝑠 ≥ 0, 
where the dual function  
𝐷(?̅?𝑠) =  max
 0̅≤?̅?𝑠≤𝑥
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐿(?̅?𝑠, ?̅?𝑠). 
To solve 𝐷(?̅?𝑠 ), first user 𝑠 maximizes over 𝑥𝑠 given 𝜆𝑠. That 
is 
𝑥𝑠  =  arg max
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑠 ≤ 𝑥𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥
 (𝑈(𝑥𝑠 , 𝜆𝑠)).               (16) 
However , since e.q.  (13) assures the minimum price charged 
to users. Thus, e.q. (16) can be expressed as follows. 
𝑥𝑠  =  arg max
0 ≤ 𝑥𝑠 ≤ 𝑥𝑠
𝑚𝑎𝑥
 (𝑈(𝑥𝑠 , 𝜆𝑠
𝑓
)) 
Next, 𝐿(?̅?𝑠, ?̅?𝑠) is minimized with subgradient projection 
method in an iterative solution given by  
𝜆𝑠
𝑡+1 =  [𝜆𝑠
𝑡 −  𝜎𝑡 (𝐶𝑠 − ∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑤
) ]
+
,                      (17) 
where 𝐶𝑠 − ∑ 𝑥𝑠𝑠𝜖𝑆  is a subgradient of 𝐷(𝜆𝑠 ) and 𝜎
𝑡 denotes the 
step size to control the tradeoff between a convergence 
guarantee and the convergence speed, such  that 
𝜎𝑡 →  0, 𝑎𝑠 𝑡 → ∞ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝜎𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
= ∞.                        (18) 
Next, after solving 𝜆𝑠
𝑡+1, then we solve for 𝜆𝑓
𝑡+1 with (13). 
Notice that in (13), 𝑔𝑠
𝑡+1 + 𝜌 serves the minimum price charged 
to user 𝑠, such that 𝜆𝑠𝑡+1 ≥ 𝑔𝑠𝑡+1 + 𝜌. Generally, the subgradient 
based solution relies on feedback loop mechanism. That is, the 
user determines the transmission rate according to the price set 
by WFP by solving (16) and the price is adjusted according to 
the traffic load by solving (17). It is repeated until it converges 
to an optimal solution. Price 𝜆𝑠 is also an indication of the 
demand for service. However, before determining the final sale 
price, WFP must consider the minimum price charged by ISP 
as described in (13). It is because WFP depends on ISP’s 
infrastructure to provide the service. The discussion on the 
minimum price is addressed in the next section.   
Proposition 1: If the step size 𝜎 in (18) satisfies (17), then the 
subgradient based algorithm converges to the optimal solution 
of problem (15). [13] ■ 
C. Minimum Price Set by ISP  
In this section, we address the pricing mechanism for ISP to 
determine the minimum price for users to get Internet access 
from either E-WFP or I-WFP.   Consider a network managed 
by ISP with a set of links 𝐿, and a set of link capacities 𝐶 over 
the links in  𝐿. Given a utility function  𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠, 𝜆𝑠) of data user 
𝑠 with bandwidth usage of 𝑥𝑠 and traffic generated by users in 
𝑆, the maximization problem can be formulated as follows. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝑈(𝑥𝑠)
𝑠∈𝑆
+ ∑ 𝑈(𝑥?̇?)
?̇?∈?̇?
,                   (19) 
 𝑠. 𝑡.   ∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑤
≤ 𝐶𝑤 ,                                 (19. 𝑎) 
∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠∈𝑙
+ ∑ 𝑥?̇?
?̇? 𝜖 𝑙
 ≤ 𝐶𝑙 ,                            (19. 𝑏) 
𝑥?̇?𝑙
′  = 𝑥?̇?,𝑙 ,                                       (19. 𝑐) 
over 𝑥?̇?, 𝑥𝑠 ≥ 0, 
where 𝑆 is a set of users that get access from WFP, ?̇? denotes a 
set of ISP subscribers (users who get access directly from ISP), 
?̇? ∈ 𝑙 and 𝑠 ∈ 𝑙 denotes WFP user 𝑠 and ISP user ?̇?  who are 
transmitting data through link 𝑙. Conditions (19.a) and (19.b) 
guarantee the link is feasible, i.e. the total traffic is less than or 
equal to the link capacity.  Condition (19.c) guarantees that the 
flows from the existing subscribers are not affected by traffic 
generated by WFPs’ users. However, the constraint (8.c) makes 
problem (19) difficult to solve, or it may not have a solution. 
To resolve this, problem (19) can be simplified by relaxing the 
constraint (19.c) and substituting it with a new constraint 
𝑈𝑠(𝑥𝑠) ≥  0 , for 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆. This way, it allows ISP to be more 
flexible with the bandwidth allocation. However, problem (19) 
becomes a non-convex problem, which is an NP-Hard problem 
[12]. It is because users with real-time traffic is usually 
modeled using a sigmoidal function, which is non-concave. 
Notice that with the new constraint, the connection quality of 
the subscribers may be compromised when network 
experiences a bottleneck. 
Hence, to resolve problem (19), we consider an equivalent 
problem. Since the objective on constraint (19.c) is to assure 
that Additional bandwidth of ISP subscribers are not affected 
by traffic generated by WFP users, ∑ 𝑥?̇??̇? 𝜖 𝑙  amount of 
bandwidth can be reserved for ISP subscribers. Thus, problem 
(19) can be simplified by combining constraints (19.a), (19,b), 
and (19.c). Hence, we consider the equivalent problem.         
max ∑ 𝑈(𝑥𝑠)
𝑠∈𝑆
                                     (20) 
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠𝜖𝑙
 ≤ 𝐶𝑙 − ∑ 𝑥?̇?
?̇?∈𝑙
, 
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑥𝑠 ≥ 0, 
The constraint in problem (20) prevents the connection quality 
of ISP’s subscribers from being compromised by traffic from 
WFP’s buyers. Therefore, packets that belong to subscribers 
receive a higher priority than those of WFP’s users during 
occurrence of network congestion. Problem (20) is similar to 
problem (15), which also can be resolved using sub-gradient 
based algorithm. To solve problem (20), users solve eq. (16) 
and ISP determines the minimum price to sell on each link 𝑙 by 
solving   
𝑔𝑙
𝑡+1 =  [𝑔𝑙
𝑡 − 𝜎𝑡 ((𝐶𝑙 − ∑ 𝑥𝑠
𝑠∈𝑆
) −  ∑ ∑ 𝑥?̅?
𝑠𝜖𝑤𝑠∈𝑙̇
) ]
+
.         (21) 
Here, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑙 denotes user 𝑠 who is transmitting data through link 
𝑙. The total minimum price to sell to user 𝑠 is 𝑔𝑠 =  ∑ 𝑔𝑙
𝑡
𝑠∈𝑙 , for 
∀𝑠, 𝑠𝜖𝑆𝑤 . 
V. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, we analyze the behavior of revenue sharing 
between ISP and WFP. More specifically, it is to investigate 
how the difference between the final sale price paid by user and 
the minimum price set by ISP influences revenue sharing, and 
whether the outcome is favorable to ISP and/or WFP. The 
analysis is conducted in two separate case studies: revenue 
sharing between ISP and E-WFP, and between ISP and I-WFP 
to highlight the differences between E-WFP and I-WFP. 
A. Revenue sharing between ISP and E-WFP 
In the simulation setup, we have a E-WFP subscribing 
Internet access from an ISP to provide Wi-Fi to users. In this 
setup, the E-WFP provides to users bandwidth of 10 MB/sec 
and the initial minimum price charged by ISP is 10 units 
currency and the total minimum profit desired by E-WFP is 5 
units currency. Thus, the initial price charged to users is 15 
units currency. We apply this set up to two scenarios we are 
investigating: firstly, when congestion occurs at the ISP’s 
network, and secondly, when there is a high demand at the 
WSP’s end but low traffic load in ISP’s network. In each 
scenario, either ISP’s or E-WFP’s price is raised incrementally 
by one unit up to 300 increments.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Revenue sharing when ISP increases the price. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Revenue sharing when E-WFP increases the price. 
 
First scenario. During ISP’s peak hours, ISP increases the 
price to reduce the amount of demand. In this scenario, there 
are ten users getting Internet access from a Wi-Fi provider, 
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 where each user receives equal amount of bandwidth 
allocation. Figure 4(a) and 4(b) illustrate that our proposed 
revenue sharing mechanism favors ISP during its peak hours, 
while at the same time ensuring that E-WFP receives some 
portion of the revenue. In other words, the majority of the 
revenue is allocated to ISP during ISP’s peak hours. The y-axis 
of figure 4(a) depicts the revenue portion allocated to ISP and 
E-WFP in unit currency and the y-axis in figure 3(b) is the 
percentage of revenue apportioned to E-WFP and ISP, totaling 
to 100%. Therefore, there is little incentive for E-WFP to 
provide Additional bandwidth during peak hours. However, as 
figure 4(c) demonstrates, regardless of how much ISP charges, 
E-WFP always receives some portion of the revenue as E-
WFP’s portion converges to a value even when ISP’s price 
continues to grow. In essence, the outcome from this scenario 
implies that during peak hours ISP receives most of the share 
of the revenue, regardless how much E-WFP charges its users. 
Second scenario. E-WFP receives a high level of demand 
from users, causing E-WFP to increase its price to users. 
However, there is low traffic at ISP’s end, where the minimum 
price decided by ISP is much lower than E-WFP’s price to 
users. In this second scenario, there are initially ten users 
getting Internet access but eventually the number of users is 
increased by five users in each iteration. Figures 5(a) and 5(b) 
illustrate the division of revenue between E-WFP and ISP as E-
WFP’s price is incrementally raised by 1 unit currency up to 
300 increments. Figure 5(a) depicts the division of revenue in 
unit currency and figure 5(b) in percentage value.  
Figure 5(a) shows that in this scenario both ISP and E-WFP 
receive relatively higher revenue due to the high demand from 
E-WFP’s users. The higher revenue received by ISP should 
provide an incentive for ISP to provide Additional bandwidth. 
From the first to the 22nd price increment, as shown in figure 
5(a), ISP receives a higher share of the revenue than E-WFP 
because up to this point the revenue is still relatively low. This 
can be justified because ISP provides and manages the 
infrastructure, a higher portion of the revenue is allocated to 
ISP to cover the cost of providing the access and managing the 
traffic from E-WFP.  
At 22nd price increment, the two lines intersect (figure 5). 
The intersection can be interpreted as when the bargaining 
power is balanced and revenue is equally shared between ISP 
and E-WFP.  However, as E-WFP continues to increase price 
and generates higher revenue, and traffic at ISP’s end remains 
low, the bargaining power progressively shifts toward E-WFP 
because of its higher “contribution” to the transaction. E-
WFP’s portion of revenue eventually converges to a region of 
70% of the total revenue (figure 4(b)), and ISP’s percentage 
share converges to 30%. Generally, the convergence to a 
specific value shows asymptotically that there is a predictable 
region of revenue sharing. Importantly, this convergence also 
provides the upper celling of the portion allocated to E-WFP, 
i.e. 70%, and the bottom limit of the portion allocated to ISP, 
i.e. 30%. The existence of these upper and lower bounds for 
revenue sharing can become the basis for both WFP and ISP to 
evaluate and negotiate the risk and gain in such trade agreement 
for mutual benefits.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Revenue sharing when bandwidth demand is low with up to 100 users. 
(a) Ratio shared revenue of WFP over ISP. (b) Average user utility. (c) The 
price that users pay for the service. (d)  Amount of bandwidth sold to users.   
 
 
Fig. 7. Revenue sharing when bandwidth demand is high with up 1100 users. 
(a) Ratio shared revenue of WFP over ISP. (b) Average user utility. (c) The 
price that users pay for the service. (d) Amount of bandwidth sold to users. 
Third scenario: we investigate the correlation between 
revenue sharing, pricing, users’ utility, and bandwidth usage. 
The simulation setup includes an WFP providing 1000MB/sec 
to users with initial minimum price charged by an ISP of 10 
units currency, minimum profit desired by the WFP is 5 units 
currency, users maximum willingness to pay is 100 units 
currency, and user utility and price are measured and 
determined using eq. (9) and (14) respectively. In this scenario, 
we consider two case studies: (𝑖) When the WFP experiences 
lower and (𝑖𝑖) higher demand for bandwidth. Case (𝒊): There 
are 10 to 100 users acquiring service from WFP. Figure 6(a) 
illustrates that shared revenue ratio of 
𝑊𝐹𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝐼𝑆𝑃 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
 increases 
as the number of users increases, which confirms our previous 
simulation results. Figure 6(b) and Figure 6(c) demonstrate that 
users’ average utility and price are stable when there is 
sufficient bandwidth for users. That is when the total 
bandwidth usage of 100 users described in Figure 6(d) is only 
700 MB/sec < 1000 MB/sec. Case (𝒊𝒊): There are 100 to 1100 
users subscribing from the WFP. The steep incline depicted in 
Figure 7(a) shows that the WFP rapidly achieves higher shared 
revenue as demands for bandwidth increase, and the WFP 
quickly attains near equal share as the ISP. In addition, the 
behavior of shared revenue illustrated in Figure 7(c) is also a 
reflection of price movement caused by the WFP hiking the 
price up when the total demands exceeds the capacity limit. 
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 This leads to the bandwidth fluctuation illustrated in Figure 
7(d) as a result from users adapting their demand for bandwidth 
when the price increases. In addition, Figure 7(a-c) reach the 
plateau (or flat) whenever bandwidth usage falls below the 
capacity limit, but change when demands go over the capacity 
limit. Moreover, Figure 7(c) also shows that user utility 
decreases as the price increases, because users obtain less 
bandwidth for higher price. Then, user utility in Figure 7(d) 
drops to zero when the price in Figure 7(b) peaks at 172 units 
currency, which results in unaffordable service leading to zero 
transaction. This also means no revenue for both the WFP and 
the ISP, as described in Figure 7(a). In conclusion, a WFP 
achieves higher shared revenue when there is high demand for 
bandwidth until the price becomes unaffordable, but this is also 
at the cost of lower user utility. On the other hand, we also 
demonstrate that a WFP also can obtain higher shared revenue 
and allow an ISP to gain higher revenue while achieving high 
user utility, when the bandwidth usage nears the limit capacity 
while keeping the price stable. Similar outcome is expected 
when an ISP price is increased beyond users’ affordability 
except higher shared revenue will apportioned to an ISP 
relative to a WFP. 
 
B. Revenue sharing between ISP and I-WFP 
Here, we investigate how the difference between the final 
sale price set by I-WFP to users  and the minimum sale price  
set by ISP influences revenue sharing, and whether the 
outcome is favorable to ISP. Finally, the simulation is 
conducted to confirm that the scheme achieves the purposes 
mentioned in the previous section, i.e. to prevent I-WFP from 
achieving net profitability after deducting their monthly 
subscription fee. In order to clearly derive and depict the 
results, we have to avoid data noise and use the minimum sale 
price 𝑔?̅?
𝑡 and the final sale price 𝜆?̇?
𝑡  after convergence.  
 
Fig. 6. Network Topology. 
 
In this simulation, we employ a network with four nodes 
(node A, B, C, and D) connected by 3 links (link AB, CD, and 
BD) with a capacity of 50 MB each, as depicted in Figure 5. 
There are four I-WFPs providing connection service. Each I-
WFP has a maximum of 200 MB in his/her data plan and he/she 
is hypothetically able to sell all of the bandwidth to users. In 
our setup, each I-WFP sells a maximum of 10 MB per 
transaction. I-WFP one is connected to node A and provides 
service to 3 users. There are 3 I-WFPs connected to node C: I-
WFP two has an user, I-WFP three has 10 users, and I-WFP 
four has 4 users. There are 4 sinks (one, two, three, and four) 
that are connected to different users and subscribers. The path 
of each connection is described as follows: 
 Users from I-WFP one is connected to sink one though link 
AB.  
 Subscribers from router A are connected to sink two through 
link AB.  
 Users of I-WFP two and three are connected to sink four 
through link CD.  
 Users of I-WFP four are connected to sink three through 
link CD and DB.  
 Subscriber from node C is connected to sink four through 
link CD. 
 Subscribers from node D are connected to sink three 
through DB.    
The simulation has three parts. First, ISP adjusts the 
minimum sale price according to the overall bandwidth 
demand by solving equation (5) and (6). Then, ISP presents the 
minimum sale price on each link to the I-WFPs in the network: 
link AB = 30 unit currency, CD = 3 unit currency, and BD = 1 
unit currency. Link BD has the highest minimum price because 
there is a higher level of demand for bandwidth. 
Simultaneously and independently, I-WFPs compute their 
price, considering the bandwidth demand from interested users 
by solving equation (5) and (11). The four I-WFPs charge their 
users at 31, 26, 5, and 8 unit currencies respectively. Finally, 
ISP computes the revenue sharing between each I-WFP and 
ISP based on the specific revenue earned by each individual I-
WFP.   
Prices 
Proces 
I-WFP 
1 2 3 4 
I-WFP’s final sale price 𝜆 (unit currency) 31 26 5 8 
Minimum price to sell 𝑔  (unit currency) 30 3 3 4 
Table 1. Price set by I-WFPs and ISP.  
The results of the revenue sharing between ISP and the 4 
I-WFPs are depicted in Figures 3(a) – 3(d). Each unit on the x-
axis represents 10 MB of bandwidth unused by I-WFP, and 
available for him/her to sell; the higher the number, the more 
bandwidth he/she still has to sell. For instance, when x = 12, 
there are still 120 MB available for sale and 80 MB already 
used. The y-axis is the percentage of revenue apportioned to 
the I-WFPs and ISP, totaling to 100%.   
We observe several important outcomes. Firstly, from the 
graphs we can establish that the financial gain is higher for I-
WFPs if they sell their bandwidth when they have more unused 
bandwidth than when they have less. This outcome confirms 
that the revenue sharing mechanism behaves as intended: as the 
amount of bandwidth used/sold increases, the revenue sharing 
mechanism discourages I-WFPs from selling their bandwidth 
by lowering their share of the revenue.  
  
 
 
Fig. 7. Revenue sharing between each I-WFP and ISP according to Shapley 
value. 
Secondly, the simulation outcome of I-WFP 1 (Figure 
7(a)) proves that ISP can discourage bandwidth sale by 
increasing the minimum price when network experiences high 
traffic load during peak hours. In this scenario, the high 
minimum price (30 unit currency) is generated due to a high 
demand for bandwidth at link AB, including demand from non-
selling subscribers. Since the request for bandwidth to I-WFP 
is low, I-WFP one is only able to set his/her price at 1 unit 
currency higher than the minimum sale price set by ISP (31 unit 
currency versus 30 unit currency).  This means I-WFP one 
contributes minimally to the transaction, hence receives only a 
negligible share of the revenue. This strategy also works to 
encourage I-WFPs to distribute the traffic load to non-peak 
hours to achieve better revenue share. 
Different from I-WFP one, there are many users seeking 
to buy bandwidth from I-WFP two. This leads to the price set 
by I-WFP two to soar to 26 unit currency, while the minimum 
price for transmitting data on link CD is only set at 5 unit 
currency by ISP. The case of I-WFP two represents situations 
where ISP is experiencing low bandwidth demand but I-WFP 
is receiving a high level of demand. Hence, the minimum price 
set by ISP is much lower than the I-WFP’s price to users. In 
such situations, the I-WFP has a higher bargaining power 
because of its higher “contribution” to the transaction. In 
recognition of this, ISP attributes a relatively higher share of 
the revenue gained from the transaction to the I-WFP. 
However, it is important to highlight here that even in such 
situations where I-WFP “contributes” significantly to the 
revenue gained, our revenue sharing scheme ensures that ISP 
still gains the majority share of the income, regardless of the 
amount of bandwidth a I-WFP has at that point of time, as 
illustrated. The next simulation confirms this effect in reverse: 
the percentage of the revenue share attributed to ISP increases 
as the difference between the minimum sale price and final sale 
price reduces, which characterize the cases with I-WFP three 
and four (Figure 7(c) and 7(d)).    
This simulation confirms that the revenue sharing 
mechanism is favorable to ISP, as intended. It reduces I-WFP’s 
portion of the revenue as more bandwidths are used/sold during 
each subscription cycle, even if the I-WFP is able to sell the 
bandwidth at a much higher price than the minimum price set 
by ISP. Sale of bandwidth is also discouraged by ISP during 
peak hours by raising the minimum sale price. The scheme also 
ensures ISP receives the majority portion of the revenue 
gained, regardless of the difference between the minimum sale 
price and the final sale price. At the same time, the scheme 
reasonably adjusts I-WFPs’ portion of the revenue upward 
when the minimum price set by ISP is much lower than the I-
WFP’s final sale price. In the following simulation, we 
investigate the maximum share of revenue that a I-WFP may 
receive at different points of bandwidth usage within a 
subscription cycle. The simulation is conducted when the I-
WFP’s total bandwidth usage is at 0%, 25%, 50%, and 75%.  
In this simulation, we have a single link network connecting 
two nodes (node A and B) with a single I-WFP connected to 
node A. The I-WFP sells a total of 10 MB to two users. The 
total capacity of link AB is 20 MB per unit time. Next, we 
increase the I-WFP’s price from 0 to 100 unit of currency when 
bandwidth usage is at 0, 25%, 50%, and 75%. Figure 8 
illustrates the share of revenue received by the I-WFP 
approaches to near 50%, even when bandwidth usage is at 0%. 
However, I-WFP’s portion of the revenue subsides as his/her 
bandwidth usage grows, as illustrated in figure 8. Conversely, 
the lowest portion of revenue ISP receives is at least 50% at all 
times.  
 
Fig. 8. Maximum and minimum shared received by I-WFPs and ISP. 
The results from this simulation provide an insight as to 
when I-WFPs will most likely sell their bandwidths. Knowing 
this and given that ISP knows how many subscribers are at 
various stages of bandwidth usage in their subscription cycle, 
ISP is able to anticipate the additional traffic that may be 
generated from I-WFP’s transactions, and devise better 
management so the connection quality of subscribers is not 
compromised. Over time, ISP may be able to estimate the size 
of such ad hoc demand by monitoring the total revenue 
generated by each I-WFP. Last but not least, it is also important 
to note that our model of bandwidth reselling and revenue 
sharing provides ISP with higher revenue from selling some of 
its bandwidth twice: first to subscribers, then to users through 
subscribers.      
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 VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we propose Shapley value based revenue 
sharing scheme and NUM based dynamic pricing strategy to 
leverage on the availability of E-WFP and I-WFP to provide 
Internet access to users. The revenue sharing and pricing 
mechanisms are designed to provide incentives for ISP, E-WFP 
and I-WFP to offer Additional bandwidth to their users. We 
demonstrate that, in cooperative revenue sharing, ISP will be 
aware of Wi-Fi providers’ final sale price to users, and this 
gives ISP better understanding of the market and more control 
over pricing. Importantly, our revenue sharing model is able to 
address critical concerns such as traffic and congestion 
management. Specifically for E-WFP, our model also captures 
the conditions in which one of the parties (ISP or E-WFP) 
receives a higher portion of the revenue. For instance, the 
revenue sharing model apportions a larger share of the revenue 
to ISP when E-WFP generates lower revenue, but favors E-
WFP when it contributes more to higher revenue. When E-
WFP contributes a significant portion of the revenue, the 
division of revenue eventually converges to the region of 70%-
30% division, the larger share given to E-WFP. Our dynamic 
pricing model and revenue sharing mechanism follow the 
economic concept of demand and supply, and critically 
considers each party’s share of contribution. However, in all 
circumstances investigated, ISP is never disadvantaged in our 
revenue sharing model. 
Contrary to the general perception that provision of on-
demand network access service is disadvantageous to ISP, our 
pricing and revenue sharing model for I-WFP’s sale of 
bandwidth to users demonstrates that it is possible for ISP to 
achieve financial gain. Importantly, by discouraging high data 
usage I-WFPs from selling and discouraging transactions 
during peak hours, our revenue sharing model is able to address 
critical concerns such as traffic management and the potential 
risk of ISP losing revenue. In addition, the scheme also 
prevents I-WFP from selling bandwidth for profit by adjusting 
the share of revenue apportioned to I-WFP according to the 
level of bandwidth usage and its “contribution” to the revenue. 
This model provides incentives for low data usage subscribers 
to keep their subscription by providing them with an 
opportunity to earn some income to offset their subscription 
fee.  
In our future work, we will investigate whether the 
economic interplay and negotiation between ISP, Wi-Fi 
providers, and users reach an equilibrium. If it does, in what 
condition the equilibrium is reached and how it impacts the 
revenue sharing mechanism. In addition, in order to design 
pricing and revenue scheme that reflect quality of service, the 
role QoE in the design will be addressed as well.    
 
REFERENCES 
[1] E. Winter. “The Shapley Value, in The Handbook of Game 
Theory” R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, North-Holland, 2002.   
[2] Y. Zick and A. Skopalik, and E. Elkind, “The Shapley Value as 
A Function of Quota in Weighted Voting Games”,  in 
International joint conference on Artificial Intelligence – Vol. 1, 
p 490-495, 2011. 
[3] F. P. Kelly, A. Maullo, D. Tan “Rate control in communication 
networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability”, 
Journal of the Operational Research Society, pp 237-252, 1998. 
[4] W. Lee, R.Mazumdar, and N. B. Shroff, "Non-convex 
optimization and rate control for multi-class services in the 
Internet," IEEE / ACM Transaction on Network, vol. 13, no. 4, 
pp. 827-840, August  2005. 
[5] H. Susanto and B. G. Kim, “Congestion Control with QoS and 
Delay Utility Function”, in IEEE ICCCN, pp. 1-5, 2013. 
[6] E. J. Friedman and D. C. Parkes, “Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: 
issues in online mechanism design”, ACM Electronic 
Commerce, 2003. 
[7] R. T. B. Ma, D. M. Chiu, J. C. S. Lui, V. Misra, and D. 
Rubenstein,” On Cooperative Settlement Between Content, 
Transit, and Eyeball Internet Service Providers”, IEEE/ACM 
Trans. on Networking, Vol. 19, No. 3,  June, 2011. 
[8] R. T. B. Ma, D. M. Chiu, J. C. S. Lui, V. Misra, and D. 
Rubenstein, “ Internet Economics: The Use of Shapley Value for 
ISP Settlement”, IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking, Vol. 18, No. 
3,  June, 2010. 
[9] Y. Cheung, D. Chiu, J. Huang, ”Can Bilateral ISP Peering Lead 
to Network-Wide Cooperative Settlement”,  IEEE ICCCN, 2008.  
[10] Y. Wu, H. Kim, P. Hande, M. Chiang, D. Tsang, “Revenue 
Sharing Among ISPs in Two-Sided Markets”,  IEEE INFOCOM, 
2011. 
[11] L. Duan, J. huang, and B. Shou, “Optimal Pricing for Local and 
Global Wifi Markets”, in IEEE INFOOM 2013.  
[12] M. Chen and J. Huang, “Optimal Resource Allocation for OFDM 
Uplink Communication: A Primal-Dual Approach” Conference 
on Information Sciences and Systems”, 2008. 
[13] R. Srikant, The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control. 
Boston, MA: Birkhauser, 2004. 
[14] H. Susanto, B. Kaushik, B. Liu, B.G. Kim, ”Pricing and Revenue 
Sharing Mechanism for Secondary Re-distribution of Data 
Service for Mobile Devices”. IEEE IPCCC, 2014. 
 
 
 
